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The default mode network (DMN) has been widely defined as a set of brain regions that
are engaged when people are in a “resting state” (left to themselves in a scanner, with no
explicit task instruction). The network emerged as a scientific object in the early twenty-
first century, and in just over a decade has become the focus of intense empirical and
conceptual neuroscientific inquiry. In this Perspective, we contribute to the work of critical
neuroscience by providing brief reflections on the birth, working life, and future of the
DMN. We consider: how the DMN emerged through the convergence of distinct lines of
scientific investigation; controversies surrounding the definition, function and localization
of the DMN; and the lines of interdisciplinary investigation that the DMN has helped to
enable. We conclude by arguing that one of the most pressing issues in the field in 2014
is to understand how the mechanisms of thought are related to the function of brain
dynamics. While the DMN has been central in allowing the field to reach this point, it
is not inevitable that the DMN itself will remain at the heart of future investigations of this
complex problem.
Keywords: functional connectivity, neuroanatomy, resting state, fMRI, history of cognitive neuroscience, mind
wandering
INTRODUCTION
The default mode network (DMN)—at times termed the default
network (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008)—came to prominence in
cognitive neuroscience as a set of brain regions that are engaged
when people are in a “resting state” (left to themselves in a
scanner, with no explicit task instruction). The DMN is about
a decade old: it emerged in the early part of the twenty-first
century—although exact dates of birth are a vexed topic when one
is talking about a scientific object. Since its emergence, interest in
the DMN has been intense and growing (see Figure 1).
If one of the tasks of “critical neuroscience” is to investi-
gate “the history of concepts, practices and objects of scientific
inquiry” (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012), then in this Perspective
we contribute to critical neuroscience by reflecting on the birth,
working life, and potential future of the scientific object that
is the DMN. We are indebted to several historians of science,
particularly Daston (2000) and Rheinberger (1997), who have
convincingly demonstrated how scientific objects—objects that
are subject, in particular times and places, to intense interest
and investigation by working scientists—should be thought of
as “simultaneously real and historical” (Daston, 2000, p. 3).
On such a model, scientific objects emerge at the intersec-
tion point of various practices, scientific apparatuses, concep-
tual frameworks and techniques, and cannot be understood
outside of them. Just as scientific objects emerge, so can and
do they at times decay or disappear: in other words, the aura
of any scientific object is always colored by its potential for
obsolescence.
CONVERGENCE, TRANSFORMATION AND CONTROVERSY
The DMN emerged through the coming together of two distinct
lines of enquiry, which we have characterized as the neuro-
physiological and the neuropsychological (Callard and Margulies,
2011). The unified field currently known as “resting-state fMRI
research”—a field intimately associated with the operations of
the DMN—was derived from two distinct lineages: Biswal et al.’s
research in the mid-1990s on functional connectivity during the
resting-state (Biswal et al., 1995; Biswal, 2012), and Raichle and
colleagues’ observation of a set of regions that were consistently
higher in activity during the resting, baseline task-state (Buckner,
2012; Snyder and Raichle, 2012).
Notably, the DMN emerged through the work of contrasting
it with that which it was considered, ontologically, not to be.
Initially, the task contrast was used to define the regions of the
DMN, which included those that were deactivated during perfor-
mance of a task when compared to the resting, baseline condition
(Shulman et al., 1997b; Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001).
This task-centric definition was then expanded in a foundational
study by Greicius et al. (2003), which linked Biswal’s resting-state
functional connectivity methodology (e.g., Biswal et al., 1995) to
the default mode hypothesis (Gusnard et al., 2001), and coined
the term “DMN”. The DMN emerged, then, in juxtaposition
with, if not in explicit opposition to, externally-focused tasks.
Greicius et al.’s (2003) article, which is commonly thought to have
launched the DMN, noted that certain brain regions “consistently
show greater activity during resting states than during cogni-
tive tasks” [italics added]. This bifurcatory framework—between
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FIGURE 1 | Number of PubMed articles that report “Default Mode” or
“Default Mode Network” and “Brain” from 2001–2013.
(particular kinds of) cognitive tasks and psychological operations
associated with the DMN—has persisted, even as it is now fre-
quently attenuated by greater acknowledgement of the undeniable
fact that cognitive work should not be restricted to externally-
focused tasks. The Cognitive Atlas currently defines the DMN
as “an organized spontaneous network of neural activity that is
modulated during attention-demanding cognition” [italics added],
which is characterized by “spontaneous BOLD signal fluctuations
which tend to inversely correlate with fluctuations in other net-
works, including those that subserve arousal, attention, percep-
tion, and working memory”.1 That this bifurcation has structured
discussions of the DMN from its birth has not only shaped what
we do talk about when we talk about the DMN (e.g., lapses or
breaks in attention) but also what we do not—or only rarely—talk
about (e.g., the potential ways in which DMN activity might well
be associated with attention—though attention conceptualized in
ways different from the standard model of external task-based
attention; see also Callard et al., 2012).
Expanding the terrain of interest from task to rest, from acti-
vation to connectivity, from a brain state (the “default mode”) to
a brain network (the “DMN”), opened up various possibilities for
describing what has been imagined as the same scientific object.
The DMN gained solidity through the conjunction of different
kinds of experimental apparatus, various experimental data, dif-
ferent sets of disciplinary expertise, and different scientific pre-
occupations. Methods derived from Biswal’s (1995) resting-state
functional connectivity (essentially originating in the question of
the constituent components of fMRI signal fluctuations), when
1http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/concept/default_mode_network [accessed 2
May 2014].
placed alongside Raichle et al.’s (2001) questions regarding the
physiological baseline of blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD)
contrast, provided multiple ways to derive what is commonly
assumed to be the same structure. But what we want really to
bring to visibility is how the different methods used to probe and
delineate what has come to be called the DMN have constituted
the network in different ways:
• Shulman et al. (1997a) reanalyzed nine PET studies of visual
processing.
• Binder et al. (1999) measured brain activation during rest using
several contrasting activation states (including tone monitoring
and semantic retrieval).
• Andreasen et al. (1995)—which, while published in the 1990s,
really came only retrospectively to be folded into the history of
the “discovery” of the DMN (e.g., see Binder, 2012; Buckner,
2012)—contrasted two different kinds of memory (what they
termed “focused episodic memory” and “random episodic
memory” [or Random Episodic Silent Thinking: REST]). They
conceptualized both in terms of activations.
• Studies using measures from graph theory (which represents
the topology of complex systems in terms of elements (nodes)
and their mutual relationships (edges)), such as centrality,
have described the core regions of the DMN independently
of psychological categories (e.g., van den Heuvel and Sporns,
2013; Sporns, 2014).
We provide these examples for two reasons. First, the DMN
emerged into the light from the dark underside of cognition
through a variety of contrasted conditions. That the network
became a positive entity via a serendipitous discovery (see
Buckner, 2012), rather than as a hypothesized entity, meant that it
was able to remain ontologically capacious. A number of answers
could therefore be given to the questions: what exactly is this
(initially under-described and under-defined) entity? What does
it do—both neuroanatomically and psychologically? How does
it differ from the various functions and activities with which it
has been contrasted? The historian of science Cornelius Borck
provides a fascinating historical comparison here, in his analysis
of physiologist Edgar Adrian’s findings regarding intrinsic gan-
glionic activity. These findings pushed Adrian to replicate Hans
Berger’s findings regarding “brain waves” and thereby challenged
Adrian’s own formulations regarding the universal code of the
nervous system (Borck, 2008). The intrinsic activity of the brain,
which, captured by the electrocardiograph as a stable, rhythmic
oscillation of approximately 10 Hz, was shown to be disturbed
by the work of mental arithmetic. That both kinds of intrinsic
activity (the brain rhythms captured by the EEG, and the slow
cortical fluctuations revealed via resting-state fMRI) were sub-
sequently tied to a variety of high-level psychological constructs
perhaps points to an enduring urge to endow the working of the
brain in its “idle” or “default” state with a dense psychological
hermeneutics.2
2We thank the reviewer Cornelius Borck for drawing out the fascinating
historical comparisons with EEG, and the work of Berger and Adrian—and
not least for pointing out how in both instances a still vague scientific object
was linked to high-level psychological constructs.
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Second, the concept of a network—which describes any inter-
connected arrangement or topology of interrelated nodes—has,
itself, a complex history in the life sciences and social sciences
(e.g., Latour, 1996; Offner, 1999), as well as more specifically
in the neurosciences. Current uses of “network” in graph the-
ory models have interesting intersections with, but cannot be
assumed wholly to overlap with, earlier models of neural networks
that were indebted to the foundational research of those such
as Bain (1873) and Hebb (1949) (which are still influential in
shaping understandings of what a brain network is). One of the
strengths of the umbrella term “network” is that it is able to
draw together a variety of models, understandings and modes of
conceptualizing interrelated entities—which themselves cross the
terrains of the anatomical, functional and psychological. While
the “DMN” is commonly assumed to have an undeniable reality
because different methods of investigation have converged on
what is assumed to be the same ontological entity (e.g., Shulman’s,
Binder’s, Andreasen’s, and van den Heuvel and Sporns’ studies
mentioned above are commonly understood as uncovering the
same thing), it remains unclear how exactly the diverse anatom-
ical, functional and psychological models of the outline and
activities of this entity relate to, and should best be sutured to one
another.
One notable example comprises the varied descriptions of the
network’s anatomical components. Controversies surrounding
the localization of various cortical regions are not uncommon
in functional neuroanatomy, especially when the areas of interest
shift beyond well-characterized functions of sensorimotor cortex.
However, the challenge of defining the anatomical components
of the DMN is further confounded by its multiple operational
definitions, each suggesting subtle spatial variations from a core
set of cortical regions along the anterior and posterior medial wall.
The notion of subsystems within the DMN has been proposed
to better describe the multiple network variants that spatially
overlap with the key medial structures (Buckner et al., 2008;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). The challenge of spatiotempo-
rally localizing the DMN is further complicated by observations
that the synchronous activity of its various regions, the defin-
ing feature of functional connectivity, is modulated dynamically
(Chang and Glover, 2010). While the DMN resides at the nexus
of multiple converging lines of research, upon close inspection
from any one angle, its features appear progressively less well
defined.
TO THE CORE OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL? THE FUNCTION
OF THE DMN
Delineations of the psychological functions of the DMN show
how its semantic capaciousness has resulted in multiple opera-
tional definitions, some of which have entailed perhaps over hasty
normative judgments about the function of the DMN in relation
to the kind of human animals that we are assumed to be.
From the start, the DMN was associated with high-level,
complex cognitive processes regarded by many as lying at the
heart of what makes the human animal “human”. For example,
Gusnard et al. (2001) linked the default mode to self-referential
mental activity: indeed, the authors argued that the “default
state of the brain instantiates functions that are integral to
the self ”. Continued research has further established the self-
referential function implicating the DMN (D’Argembeau et al.,
2005; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Salomon et al., 2009, 2014).
Greicius et al. (2003) argued in their seminal 2003 paper that
mapping the DMN “may provide insight into the neural under-
pinnings of a critical but poorly understood component of human
consciousness variably referred to as “a conscious resting state”,
“stimulus-independent thought”, or a “default mode of brain”.
Mazoyer et al. (2001) stated that “A large part of our daily mental
activities are internalized, id est performed without input or
motor output, and not goal directed”—and raised the possibility
that this “particular state of consciousness” is associated both
with the monitoring of “somesthesic and vegetative information,
. . . and experiencing association of free thoughts that deal with
the recollection of past experiences, inner speech, mental images,
emotions, planning of future activities, etc.” Andreasen et al.
(1995) understood their study to be “explor[ing] the neural
circuitry of the activities of mind as well as brain, especially
those that impinge on important human characteristics, such
as the capacity for consciousness, self awareness, and creativity”.
fMRI activations associated with the resting state were, from this
early work onwards (e.g., Andreasen et al., 1995; Binder et al.,
1999), considered candidates for higher psychological processes
rather than being regarded as solely associated with physiological
functions. In this regard, the ground had been laid by earlier
research by David Ingvar on regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF),
using the 133 Xenon clearance technique. Ingvar, in documenting
hyperfrontal distribution of the “cerebral gray matter flow in
resting wakefulness”, argued that such frontal activity “implie[d]
. . . a temporal sequence of thoughts with a goal direction”—in
short, that the brain was “automatically busy with extrapolation
of future events . . . in order to be ready for what may happen”
(Ingvar, 1979).
Virtually all the constructs mentioned in the paragraph above
operate at a high level of abstraction (e.g., “self ”, “free thought”,
“self awareness”, “creativity”): it might almost be said that every
high-level psychological construct was imagined as being poten-
tially associated with this network’s operations. Considering that
the DMN’s regions constitute a substantial portion of associative
cortex, implication of the DMN across the breadth of higher
function may not be inaccurate, but if its functions account for
everything, the research challenge is shifted to understanding the
workings of its subcomponents.
More recently, investigation of the psychological functions of
the DMN has been increasingly enabled through one (equally
high-level) construct: that of “mind-wandering”. In Callard et al.
(2013), we provided a conceptual and empirical analysis not
only of an increasingly intimate association (from 2007 onwards)
between research on mind-wandering and research on the DMN,
but of how much of this research has been “negatively” driven by
characterizing the network’s psychological activity as a “break” or
“lapse”, or through explicitly contrasting it with some of the key
constructs employed within cognitive psychology (e.g., attention,
memory) (Weissman et al., 2006). While the close association
between mind-wandering research and DMN research has been
enormously productive for both arenas of inquiry, it has likely
led to too tight an association between mind-wandering and
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the so-called “task-negative” network. To imagine that such a
complex phenomenological experience as described by the term
“mind-wandering” might be subserved by one brain network
alone runs the risk of restricting investigation of more hetero-
geneous forms of spontaneous cognition. This one-to-one map-
ping makes it harder to investigate the complex inter-relations
between a number of networks that might well contribute to
these heterogeneous psychological states. One key question for the
field, then, is what consequences follow from a tight interlocking
of (one) mental experience (mind-wandering) and (one) brain
network (DMN). Other ways of envisaging relations between
psychological processes and brain dynamics might well emerge in
its place.
Secondly, the tendency to install characteristics that lie at the
core of human subjectivity (e.g., creativity, free thoughts, etc.)
within the DMN has gone hand in hand with a tendency to judge
the kind of human animal that we are. Killingsworth and Gilbert
(2010), for example, argue that “a human mind is a wandering
mind, and a wandering mind is an unhappy mind. The ability to
think about what is not happening is a cognitive achievement that
comes at an emotional cost.” The strong ontological claim about
the unhappy human mind is hung on one, necessarily limited,
empirical study. Such strong normative claims, in relation to a
youthful field in which so much is still unclear, are striking and,
we contend, likely to be premature.
WHITHER THE DMN?
The DMN has been remarkably productive in bringing hith-
erto marginalized fields and methods inside the perimeters of
cognitive neuroscience—and, through such incursions, sparked
new lines of conceptual and methodological inquiry. Topics such
as mind-wandering, previously considered largely beyond the
purview of cognitive psychology, have emerged as heated areas of
research (Callard et al., 2013). Neuropsychoanalytic researchers
have found the DMN to be a rich concept through which to
advance formulations about psychic energy (Carhart-Harris and
Friston, 2010), psychodynamic concepts of self in relation to
objects (Northoff, 2011) and fantasy (Zellner, 2013). There is
currently methodological interest in using a variety of tools,
including introspection, descriptive experience sampling, and
free association (many of which are marginalized in cognitive
psychology) to access the complex shapes of “inner experi-
ence” characteristic of the default mode (e.g., Fell, 2013). The
DMN, in collaboration with other resting-state networks, has
opened the possibility for network-level interpretations of brain
function.
The DMN has had great success in generating fertile tracks for
scientific inquiry. As Daston has argued, the creation and solidifi-
cation of a scientific object, via the drawing together of heteroge-
neous findings and phenomena, can help generate a wide variety
of novel empirical and theoretical formulations (Daston, 2000,
p. 5). Rheinberger has demonstrated how productive “imprecise”
scientific objects with fuzzy boundaries can be. Such objects,
with their “characteristic, irreducible vagueness” are necessarily
precarious: they are “absent in their experimental presence”, since
they are characterized precisely by that which scientists do not yet
know (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 28).
The DMN has accomplished its initial mission of making it
possible to ask questions about baseline brain activity within
cognitive neuroscience. In this respect, it is worth considering
whether the network plays a similar role to that played by
mirror neurons, about which Ramachandran (2000) argued, in
optimistic vein: “mirror neurons will do for psychology what
DNA did for biology: they will provide a unifying frame-
work and help explain a host of mental abilities that have
hitherto remained mysterious and inaccessible to experiments”.
The high level abstraction of the DMN (due partly to the
broad definition of its function) allows for sharing between sev-
eral diverse research communities with different understandings
of the meanings and characteristics of “default”, “mode”, and
“network”.
In 2014, as the concept of the DMN reaches adolescence,
one question to consider is whether—and when—it might be
transformed into or translated into other scientific objects. The
first decade of the DMN’s life could be characterized through two,
overlapping phases:
• Phase 1: Exploration of various functions involved in the
default mode (the era of the discovery of intrinsic brain
activity).
• Phase 2: Exploration of the function of the DMN qua network
(through the tools of functional connectivity).
We contend that the central task of Phase 3, whose time is
now, comprises the exploration of thought qua thought and its
relation to intrinsic brain dynamics. Building on earlier work that
describes the DMN as the primary seat of mind wandering, the
current state of research on spontaneous cognition extends the
terrain of inquiry, pointing to the involvement of regions both
within and outside of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). As
the research agenda turns to the question of spontaneous thought
itself, rather than specifically the function of the DMN, the path
of inquiry that the DMN has enabled is, perhaps, on the way to
making its key role unnecessary.
The DMN might, then, at a certain point, either shift into
becoming an entity that is taken for granted in everyday life (but
one that is not the focus of intense scientific investigation) or
might disintegrate or even disappear. Although it has enabled new
fields to arise around critical research questions, we should not
take for granted that it will be the DMN as a scientific object
that will be most critical in effecting progress in understanding
the relationship between thought and brain dynamics.
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